International trade exposure affects job creation and destruction along the intensive margin (job flows due to expansions and contractions of firms' employment) as well as along the extensive margin (job flows due to births and deaths of firms). This paper uses 1992-2010 yearly employment data from the universe of U.S. establishments to construct job flows at both the industry and commuting-zone levels, and then estimates the impact of import exposure from China on each job-flow type. We find that the 'China shock' affects U.S. employment mainly through deaths of establishments. At the commuting-zone level, we find evidence of job reallocations from the Chinese-competition exposed sector to the nonexposed sector. This happens in spite of a reduction in the nonexposed sector's gross rate of job creation because of an even greater reduction in the gross rate of job destruction.
Introduction
Net employment changes conceal large changes in gross job flows. Using the universe of establishments of the U.S. from the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) database, Figure 1 shows the ratio of three-year net employment changes (gross job creation − gross job destruction) to total gross job reallocations (gross job creation + gross job destruction) for manufacturing, nonmanufacturing, and all industries from 1992-1995 to 2009-2012. In absolute value, the averages of these ratios are only 0.17 for manufacturing, 0.15 for non-manufacturing, and 0.14 for all industries, showing a stark contrast between net employment changes and actual job turnover in the U.S. economy. Hence, to properly assess the costs and benefits of any shock that affects U.S. labor markets, it is crucial to understand not only its net employment effects but also its impact on gross job flows. 1993 −1996 1996 −1999 1999 −2002 2002 −2005 2005 −2008 2008 Non−Manufacturing All Industries The objective of this paper is to estimate the impact of the so-called 'China shock'-the dramatic increase in Chinese import penetration in the U.S. since the 1990s-on each of the components of U.S. job flows at both the industry and commuting-zone levels. We decompose gross job creation into its births and expansions components, and gross job destruction into its deaths and contractions components. To guide our empirical exercise we build on the comprehensive work of Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price (2016) -AADHP hereafter-who in addition to a local-labormarkets analysis of the China shock on net employment changes as in Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) , perform an industry-level analysis that considers manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries, as well as upstream and downstream linkages across industries.
Ratio
In addition to providing a more complete picture of U.S. employment dynamics after the China trade shock, our focus on job flows is within the scope of modern models of trade with heterogeneous firms. Indeed, the seminal models of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003) have clear-cut implications for the effects of trade liberalization on gross job creation and destruction. For example, in their Ricardian model simulation of a 5 percent decline in trade barriers, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) obtain an increase of 1.5 percent in the rate of gross job creation (from plants that expand) and an increase of 2.8 percent in the rate of job destruction (from plants that contract or die), for a net employment decline of 1.3 percent. Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) tackle the job turnover implications of a Heckscher-Ohlin augmented version of the Melitz model. After trade liberalization, the standard Melitz model predicts gross job creation from expanding exporting firms and new entrants, and gross job destruction from the death and contraction of less productive firms. In their version, Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) obtain that the net employment effect is positive in the industries in which a country has comparative advantage, and is negative otherwise.
Our empirical analysis shows that U.S. net job destruction due to the China shock is mainly driven by an increase in the rate of job destruction due to deaths of establishments. This result appears not only for the direct effect of Chinese import penetration, but also for its upstream and downstream effects (the effects that flow from buying industries to a selling industry, and vice versa). The analysis of local labor markets shows that the decline in the employment-to-population ratio in the (Chinese-imports) exposed sector-after an increase in Chinese import penetration-is the result of increases in the gross rates of job destruction by both deaths and contractions, but the effect of deaths is more important. This paper also finds novel evidence of job reallocation effects from exposed sectors to nonexposed sectors at the commuting-zone level. A nonexposed sector is indirectly affected by the China shock through job reallocation effects and aggregate demand effects. Given that these indirect channels have opposite effects on the nonexposed sector's employment, it is not surprising that previous studies have not found evidence of them when looking at net employment changes (they cancel each other out). This paper is not only able to find statistically significant evidence of net job reallocation effects, but by focusing on all the job flows components, it is also able to capture evidence of these counteracting indirect effects.
Highlighting the benefits of looking at job flows, we find that the positive net job reallocation from the exposed sector to the nonexposed tradable sector happens in spite of a reduction in the sector's gross rates of job creation (for both births and expansions). This is only possible because of an even greater reduction in the sector's gross rates of job destruction (for both deaths and contractions). With firms hiring and being born at a lower pace (due to aggregate demand shocks), but firms dying and contracting at an even lower rate, the net result is an increase in the employment-to-population ratio in the nonexposed tradable sector. We also find strong and significant evidence of an increase in the rate of job creation by births in the nonexposed nontradable sector, which suggest job reallocations from the exposed sector. However, the net effect in that sector is insignificant due to large but imprecise job destruction effects. This paper highlights the important role that deaths of establishments play in U.S. net job destruction as a consequence of the China shock. This result is useful to better gauge the associated benefits and costs of increased trade with China. On the one hand, if dying firms are unproductive or obsolete, the China shock may simply be accelerating the process of creative destruction, which may lead to productivity increases and is a source of benefits (see, for example, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996) . 2 On the other hand, a net employment decline due to an increase in job destruction by deaths of establishments is likely to be more costly than a decline due to a reduction in the rate of expansions or births. Along these lines, Klein, Schuh, and Triest (2003) refer to the destruction of human capital and search and relocation costs associated with higher rates of job destruction, as opposed to less pervasive effects of a reduction in the rate of job creation. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the NETS data, and section 3 provides a brief overview of the evolution of job flows. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis for the impact of Chinese import penetration on U.S. job flows, starting with the industry-level analysis and then moving to the local-labor-markets approach. In section 5 we present a falsification exercise that explains the discrepancies in predicted employment changes between our three-year difference estimation and the long-difference estimation of AADHP. Lastly, section 6 concludes.
Job Flows Data
This paper constructs job flows from the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) database, which reports yearly data on employment, sales, industry, location, year of entry, and year of exit, for the universe of establishments in the U.S. from 1992 to 2012.
As described by Neumark, Zhang, and Wall (2007) and Neumark, Wall, and Zhang (2011) , who provide an exhaustive assessment of the NETS database, the NETS database reports higher employment levels than the BLS's Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). They attribute the difference to the NETS better coverage of small establishments, as well as to the fact that the BLS data excludes self-employed workers and proprietors. Comparing the NETS data against the Current Employment Statistics (CES) database of the BLS, Neumark, Wall, and Zhang (2011) find that their correlation at the county-by-industry level is 0.99. Also, focusing on biotech companies, they show that NETS is able to detect 88 percent of new companies within a year.
Their assessment also reports some employment stickiness in the NETS data from year to year, and argue that three-period differences are sufficient to avoid most of this problem. Following their suggestion, this paper calculate job flows using three year changes. Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013) compare the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) of the Census Bureau against the NETS database and report that while the LBD contains about 7 million establishments in a typical year, NETS contains about 14.7 million establishments in a typical year. They attribute the difference to the inclusion of nonemployer businesses in NETS, while the LBD includes establishments if they have at least one employee. To avoid nonemployer businesses, we restrict our NETS data to establishments that had 5 or more employees in at least one year in our sample.
AADHP use employment data from the County Business Patterns (CBP) of the Census Bureau.
After carefully following AADHP's industry codes, we create a version of the NETS database that matches their industry classification. There are 392 industries at the four-digit SIC level, and 87 non-manufacturing industries. At the industry level, the correlation between employment levels of the CBP database and our NETS database is 0.93, while at the commuting-zone level the correlation is 0.99. On average, our NETS data reports about 10 percent more employment for all industries, and 19 percent more employment for manufacturing industries.
A Brief Description of U.S. Job Flows
We calculate three-year job flows from our NETS dataset as follows. Let L ijt denote total employment in commuting zone i, in industry j, at year t. Hence, it always holds that
where L ijt −L ijt−3 is the net employment change between t−3 and t, B ijt is the employment change due to births of establishments, D ijt is the employment change due to deaths of establishments, E ijt is the employment change due to expansions of establishments, and C ijt is the employment change due to contractions of establishments. After obtaining the industry-commuting zone level data, we can aggregate at the industry level, or at the commuting zone level. Identity (1) ignores the relocation margin of employment, i.e. move-ins and move-outs of establishments across commuting zones. However, as shown by Neumark, Zhang, and Wall (2007) using the NETS data, the relocation margin is largely insignificant, so we exclude it from the computations to sharpen the focus on the four job-flow drivers described above. 3 Figure 2 shows four metrics for the three-year changes in job flows across all industries from 1992 to 2012. The first metric shows job creation due to births and expansions (Figure 2a ), the second shows the average share of job creation due each to births and expansions (Figure 2b ), the third shows job destruction due to deaths and contractions ( Figure 2c ), and the fourth and last shows the average share of job destruction due each to deaths and contractions ( Figure 2d ).
Unsurprisingly, Figure 2a shows a peak for births toward the end of the 1990s, and Figure 2c shows two peaks for deaths around 2001-2004 and 2008-2011 . Figures 2b and 2d show that births and deaths dominate the job creation and destruction process, respectively. 2000-2003, 2001-2004, 2002-2005, and then again in 2005-2008, 2006-2009, 2007-2010, and 2008-2011, coinciding with the bursting of the Dotcom Bubble and the Great Recession. Prior to 2000, births were far and away the largest single factor in job flows, but since then, deaths took over as the most important source of job reallocation. Figure 3 illustrates the patterns in Table   A .1 by showing the evolutions of the net extensive margin of employment (Births − Deaths), the intensive margin of employment (Expansions − Contractions), and overall net job creation. Note that the intensive margin is a source of job creation for the U.S. economy during the entire period, but the extensive margin is the main driver of overall net effects.
Breaking out the job flows by industry groupings, Figure A .1 in the Appendix shows the composition and evolution of job creation and destruction in the manufacturing sector. 1993−1996 1996−1999 1999−2002 2002−2005 2005−2008 1993−1996 1996−1999 1999−2002 2002−2005 2005−2008 1993−1996 1996−1999 1999−2002 2002−2005 2005−2008 1993−1996 1996−1999 1999−2002 2002−2005 2005−2008 Figure A .1c, we can see that after a sharp increase starting from 1996-1999, job destruction reached its peak in 2000-2003. This was followed by a sharp decline, driven mostly by decreasing contractions of establishments. Figure A.1d shows that 62 percent of job destruction is accounted for by deaths of establishments; hence, the extensive margin dominates in job destruction in the manufacturing sector. .8 1993−1996 1996−1999 1999−2002 2002−2005 2005−2008 2008−2011 Birth share in job creation Death share in job destruction (a) Manufacturing industry .5 .6
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Share 1993−1996 1996−1999 1999−2002 2002−2005 2005−2008 2008−2011 Birth share in job creation Death share in job destruction accounted for a much larger share in total job reallocation than it did previously, speaking again to the importance of using the NETS dataset to tease out changes in the intensive and extensive margins.
Empirical Analysis
Our exercise builds on AADHP, who provide the most comprehensive analysis for the impact of the China shock on U.S. net employment changes. AADHP focus on three periods, 1991-1999, 1999-2011, and 1999-2007 , using stacked differences of the first two periods as a benchmark, and excluding the Great Recession years (2008-2011) as a robustness check in some specifications. In our case, working with such long differences is not an option because longer time periods artificially increase the importance of the extensive margin of employment, and would miss substantial job creation and destruction on both the intensive and extensive margins. 4
Therefore, we work instead with a panel of non-overlapping three-year differences. To remain as close as possible to the periods analyzed by AADHP, we start in 1992 (our first year with NETS data) and end in 2010. Hence, our benchmark specifications contain six periods, 1992-1995, 1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, 2004-2007, 2007-2010 . Some specifications split the panel in 1998, and some others exclude the last period. For comparison purposes, online Appendix B presents a full replication of AADHP's main results using their CBP data as well as our NETS data, but starting in 1992 instead of 1991.
We start by looking at the responses of manufacturing industry-level employment to Chinese import exposure. Then we expand the industry-level analysis to include non-manufacturing industries and upstream and downstream linkages across industries. Finally, we follow a local-labor-markets analysis by calculating job flows for exposed and non-exposed industries at the commuting-zone level.
Manufacturing Employment and the China Shock
This section looks exclusively at manufacturing employment responses to Chinese import exposure.
Hence, we aggregate job flows across all commuting zones for each of the 392 manufacturing industries. To measure Chinese import exposure, we use the exact measure of AADHP, who define Chinese import penetration in industry j at year t as
where M C jt are real U.S. imports from China in industry j at year t, and Y j91 + M j91 − X j91 is real domestic absorption of U.S. industry j (the industry's real output, plus real imports, less real exports) in 1991. 5
Similar to AADHP, we use the operator "∆" to denote the annualized change of a variable times 100. Hence, in our exercise with three-year differences, for any variable X we define ∆X t as
which is simply referred to as the "annual change in X". Thus, the specification to study the impact of Chinese import exposure on U.S. manufacturing net employment is
where for industry j from t − 3 to t, ∆ ln L jt is the annual change in log employment, and ∆IP jt is the annual change in Chinese import penetration. The term α t denotes a time fixed effect, Z j is a vector of time-invariant industry-level controls, and ε jt is the error term.
The annual change in industry j's log employment can be split into its job-flow components.
In particular, given that the employment change in industry j from year t − 3 to year t is due to establishments' expansions, contractions, births and deaths, we can write ∆ ln L jt as
where b jt denotes the contribution of births to the industry's employment log change, and the same for deaths (d jt ), expansions (e jt ), and contractions (c jt ). We calculate b jt as
with analogous expressions for d jt , e jt , and c jt .
Thus, for each job flow we estimate
where
Note that we also estimate the impact of Chinese import exposure on the net extensive margin of employment, b jt − d jt , the net intensive margin of employment, e jt − c jt , gross job creation, b jt + e jt , and on gross job destruction, d jt + c jt . By construction, linear combinations of the import-exposure coefficients from (4) must be equivalent to the import-exposure coefficient from the regression of the log-employment annual change in (3). That is, it must always be the case that 
is the sum of eight high-income countries' imports from China, M C * jt , relative to 1988 U.S. real domestic absorption. 6
Columns 1 and 2 use all the periods but differ in their estimation method. Although OLS and IV results are similar in sign and statistical significance, the IV coefficients are about twice as large as the OLS coefficients. For the rest of the paper we focus exclusively on IV estimation results. As in AADHP, an increase in Chinese import penetration is associated with net job destruction. The most important result in column 2, however, comes from the analysis of the job-flow coefficients.
Note that only the increase in job destruction by deaths significantly matters to explain the result on net employment growth. The coefficients on births and expansions are very close to zero, and the coefficient on contractions is not statistically significant. The estimated share of deaths in total Chinese-induced job reallocation, represented withδ and calculated aŝ
is 0.71. Columns 3, 5, and 6 show that the results barely change if we reduce the sample to exclude the Great Recession, or if we exclude data before 1998.
Column 4 uses only data from 1992 to 1998 and shows that, in spite of non-significant net job destruction from an increase in Chinese import exposure during that period, there are statistically significant increases in the rates of job creation by births and expansions, and in the rates of job destruction by deaths and contractions. This is a typical example on how net employment changes conceal large changes in job flows: there is substantial job creation but also large job destruction, with total Chinese-induced job reallocation (|β b | + |β d | + |β e | + |β c | = 1.64) being more than 9 1992-2010 1992-2010 1992-2007 1992-1998 1998-2010 1998-2007 (1) (
Net employment growth -0.15*** -0.30** -0.28** -0. (3) and (4). All regressions include time fixed effects (not reported) and are weighted by 1992 employment. The net growth regression with CBP data is weighted by 1992 CBP employment and is reported for the purpose of comparison with the net growth regression with NETS data. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the three-digit industry level. The coefficients are statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level. times larger than the net effect. During this period, the share of deaths in total Chinese-induced job reallocation is only 0.33.
Comparing the net growth results from the NETS data in the first row against the net growth results from the CBP data of AADHP in the last row, we see that they are similar in sign and statistical significance but they differ in their magnitudes. In all columns, theβ's from CBP are between 2.2 and 2.6 times larger in magnitude than theβ's from NETS. This does not necessarily imply that predicted employment losses are larger when using the CBP data, as NETS reports in general more employment than CBP. For an appropriate comparison, we follow Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and AADHP and calculate 1992-2010 predicted employment changes as
whereβ is either the NETS or CBP coefficient from the net growth regression in column 2, L j10 is either the NETS or CBP employment in industry j in 2010, and ρ = 0.46 is the partial R−squared from the first-stage regression of ∆IP it on ∆IP * it . Using (6), the predicted net employments losses associated to Chinese import exposure from 1992 to 2010 are 190,000 jobs when using the NETS data, and 249,000 jobs when using the CBP data. Thus, net employment losses are 24 percent less with the NETS data. If we exclude the Great Recession years, the net growth coefficients from column 3 imply net losses of 193,000 jobs with the NETS data and 360,000 jobs with the CBP data-net job losses from NETS are 46 percent smaller. This discrepancy may be due to remnant effects of the NETS data stickiness described above, or simply due to idiosyncratic characteristics of each dataset.
Another contrasting result regarding the estimates for β from the CBP data, is their lower magnitude when compared to the original results in AADHP. The Chinese import exposure coefficients for the 1991-2011 and 1991-2007 IV regressions in AADHP (the closest to our net growth regressions in columns 2 and 3) are -1.30 and -1.24, with predicted losses of 837,000 and 853,000 manufacturing jobs. If we adjust their regressions to start in 1992 (along with 1992 employment weights), the coefficients barely change to -1.33 and -1.26, with predicted job losses of 826,000 and 842,000. Hence, from their long-difference specifications, AADHP predict between 2.3 and 3.3 times more Chinese-induced job losses than with a similar specification with three-year differences. 7
As an explanation for this disparity, section 5 shows that the long-difference specifications likely confound past employment changes with future changes in import exposure.
As robustness checks, Table 2 builds on columns 2 and 3 from Table 1 by In comparison, the import exposure coefficients in the net growth regressions using 1992-2010 CBP data become closer to the NETS net coefficients when one-digit manufacturing sector controls are added, but they become statistically insignificant. However, column 5 shows that if we exclude the Great Recession period, the CBP coefficient is smaller in magnitude but regains its statistical significance. An important caveat is the outcome in column 6, which shows everything losing statistical significance when industry-level fixed effects are added, suggesting important industrylevel trends. 8
Upstream and Downstream Sectoral Linkages
This section considers input-output linkages across industries. As in Pierce and Schott (2016) , AAHDP argue that upstream and downstream linkages across industries can increase or decrease the impact of the China shock on U.S. employment. Upstream linkages refer to effects flowing upward from a purchasing industry to a selling industry: if an industry is negatively affected by the China shock, it will decrease its purchases and hence negatively affect providing industries.
Hence, it is expected that an increase in upstream Chinese exposure drives down an industry's employment. Downstream linkages, on the other hand, refer to effects flowing downward from a selling industry to a purchasing industry: if an industry contracts due to higher Chinese exposure, (3) and (4) with industrylevel time invariant controls. All regressions include time fixed effects and are weighted by 1992 employment. The net growth regression with CBP data is weighted by 1992 CBP employment. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the three-digit industry level. The coefficients are statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
purchasing industries have less access to domestic inputs, which may cause them to contract too; however, these displaced domestic inputs may be replaced by cheaper Chinese inputs, which has a countervailing impact on purchasing industries. Thus, an increase in downstream Chinese exposure may decrease or increase an industry's employment.
Most of non-manufacturing firms are non-importing industries and therefore, they do not have an associated direct import penetration measure as defined in (2). However, these non-importing non-manufacturing industries purchase inputs from and sell goods to importing industries. Hence, a benefit of the input-output approach is that we are able to obtain measures of indirect import exposure for non-importing non-manufacturing firms.
To calculate upstream and downstream import penetration measures, which are weighted averages of the industries' direct import penetration measures, AADHP use the 1992 input-output table from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) as follows. If µ gj denotes industry g's purchases from industry j, the share of industry g in total sales of industry j is given by ω U gj = µ gj / g µ g j . Thus, the upstream Chinese import penetration measure for industry j is calculated as
where IP gt is the direct Chinese import penetration in industry g as defined in (2). Similarly, the share of industry g in total purchases of industry j is ω D jg = µ jg / g µ jg , so that the downstream Chinese import penetration measure for industry j is
The main analysis on input-output linkages of AADHP separately includes ∆IP jt , ∆U IP jt , and ∆DIP jt as regressors in their net-employment-growth IV regressions, using ∆IP * jt , ∆U IP * jt , and ∆DIP * jt as instruments. 9 Given that their estimated coefficient on ∆DIP jt is not statistically significant in any of their specifications, they focus their discussion on predicted employment losses from specifications that only include ∆IP jt and ∆U IP jt . As well, they estimate a specification that combines IP jt and U IP jt in a single measure, ∆(IP jt + U IP jt ), which yields similar results to the specification that includes them separately.
To simplify our job flows analysis, here we follow the latter approach and focus on combined measures of Chinese import exposure. The first combined measure adds the direct and upstream measures, ∆(IP jt +U IP jt ), while the second combined measure adds all three, ∆(IP jt +U IP jt +DIP jt ).
As in AADHP, instruments are included separately, using ∆IP * jt and ∆U IP * jt as instruments for the first measure, and adding ∆DIP * jt for the second measure. We also tried using as instruments ∆(IP * jt + U IP * jt ) for the first measure, and ∆(IP * jt + U IP * jt + DIP * jt ) for the second measure, with the results barely changing in magnitude and significance.
Pooling all manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries, Table 3 presents our IV estimation results for the impact of combined measures of Chinese import exposure on net employment growth (measured as the log-employment annual change), and on each of its job-flow components. 9 To construct U IP * jt and DIP * jt , we simply have to replace IPgt with IP * gt in (7) and (8). Across all specifications, the first row in Table 3 shows that an increase in any of the combined measures of Chinese import exposure is associated with net job destruction. As before, the job-flow regressions show that job destruction by deaths of establishments is the main driver of this result:
the import-exposure coefficient on deaths is the largest in magnitude in all specifications, and is the only one that significantly matters in columns 1-4. Based on theδ measure in (5), deaths explain between 69 and 73 percent of direct and upstream Chinese-induced job reallocation (from columns 1-3), and explain between 59 and 61 percent if we also consider downstream exposure (from columns 4-6).
Columns 5 and 6 show richer job-flow dynamics. In contrast to columns 2-3, column 5 shows that when we add downstream import exposure, there is also statistically significant job destruction due to establishments' contractions. As well, columns 5 and 6 also show important countervailing channels of job creation, as shown by statistically significant import-exposure coefficients in the "job creation" regression in column 5, and in the regression for births in column 6. Hence, although downstream import exposure increases the rates job destruction by both deaths and contractions, that effect is watered down by an increase in the rate of job creation (mainly due to births). These results show the counteracting forces of downstream import penetration described above, which cannot be observed if we look only at net employment changes.
Comparing the magnitude of the net coefficients in the first row, note that their size is equal or slightly smaller when using the second combined measure of import exposure. This, however, does not mean that predicted employment losses are smaller when we consider downstream exposure, as changes in the second measure of import exposure are likely to be larger than changes in the first measure. To know whether there are larger or smaller predicted losses with the second measure, we need to use a formula similar to (6). Following AADHP, to calculate losses we focus on the specifications in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, which do not include the one-digit manufacturing sector dummies. All the predicted employment changes discussed in this paper, as well as the contributions of each type of job flow, are summarized in Table 5 Equations (7) and (8) show first-order upstream and downstream import penetration measures.
Following Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012), AADHP also consider higherorder (HO) upstream and downstream linkages-e.g., an industry is also affected by shocks to one of its buyers' buyers or sellers, or by shocks to one of its sellers' buyers or sellers, and so on. Along these lines, Table A .2 in the Appendix presents our estimation of the effects of the HO-combined measures of Chinese import exposure on U.S. net employment and job flows. When compared to Table 3 , the results barely changes in terms of signs, magnitudes, and statistical significance.
In comparison with the predicted employment changes of the corresponding first-order specifications, Table 5 shows that net job losses are between 34 and 39 percent higher when considering higher-order upstream linkages (461,000 in 1992-2010, and 421,000 in 1992-2007) , and are between 45 and 49 percent higher when also taking into account downstream linkages (623,000 in 1992-2010, and 570,000 in 1992-2007). The later case yields the largest net destruction in our industry-level analysis. As well, the share of net losses occurring in non-manufacturing industries rises to 32 percent when accounting for HO upstream linkages, and to 45 percent when also accounting for HO downstream linkages.
The higher-order results in Table 5 also show that the net outcome obscures a large amount of Chinese-induced job reallocation. Note, for example, that job destruction by deaths in 1992-2010 and 1992-2007 is larger than the net outcome (703,000 in the first period, and 591,000 in the second period), with further significant destruction from contractions; in addition, there are significant sources of job creation by expansions in 1992-2010, and by births in 1992-2007. In the end, total job reallocation in the industry-level analysis is almost twice as much the net effect in 1992-2010, and 1.8 times the net effect for the 1992-2007 period.
For the net-growth regressions using the CBP data in Tables 3 and A .2, the import exposure coefficients are again similar in sign and statistical significance to those obtained with NETS in the first row, but they are between 1.7 and 3 times larger in magnitude. In terms of net employment changes, Table 5 shows that the CBP data predicts between 1.8 and 2 times more losses than the NETS data in the 1992-2010 period, and between 2.3 and 2.5 times more losses in the 1992-2007 period. 10 In spite of these differences, which we attribute to idiosyncratic characteristics of each dataset and remnants of NETS stickiness, CBP and NETS data never yield conflicting estimates for net employment responses. Hence, we are confident in the strength of our qualitative results.
Similar to the previous section, the CBP's predicted net losses from our three-year difference specifications are smaller (by about half in most cases) than those obtained using the long-difference specifications of AADHP. For example, while our CBP specification that considers higher-order upstream exposure predicts net losses of about 1 million jobs during the 1992-2010 period, the equivalent specification of AADHP predicts losses of 2.15 million jobs. Section 5 looks carefully into the cause of this discrepancy.
Local-Labor-Markets Approach
The influential work of Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) showed that, due to aggregate demand effects, import competition from China has employment effects in local labor markets that go far deeper than the impact in directly exposed sectors. For example, displaced workers from an exposed industry in Pittsburgh will have less income, which then drives these fired workers to spend less in other goods and services such as haircuts, which then depresses the incomes of barbershops and hair salons, and so forth. AADHP extend this framework to try to capture job reallocations from exposed sectors to non-exposed sectors.
This analysis is based on the 722 U.S. commuting zones of Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and AADHP. The first step is to obtain a measure of Chinese import exposure at the commuting zone level. Starting from the annualized three-year changes in industry-level import penetration, we calculate the change in import penetration in a commuting zone using as weights the initial employment share of each industry in total commuting-zone employment. That is,
where ∆IP CZ it is the annual change in import penetration in commuting zone i from t−3 to t, L ijt−3 is the level of employment in commuting zone i in industry j at t − 3, L it−3 = j L ij t−3 is total employment in commuting zone i at t − 3, and ∆IP jt is the annual change in import penetration in industry j from t − 3 to t as defined in section 4.1.
Following AADHP's approach, each of the 479 industries is classified into one of three sectors: exposed, nonexposed tradable, and nonexposed nontradable. 11 We use k ∈ {1, 2, 3} to indicate sector type, so that 1 identifies the exposed sector, 2 identifies the nonexposed tradable sector, and 3 identifies the nonexposed nontradable sector. After classifying each industry in each commuting zone, we then aggregate the NETS job flows data across the three sectors and the 722 commuting zones. This creates a panel with 12,996 observations: 722 commuting zones, three sectors, and six three-year periods.
The dependent variable in the local-labor-market analysis is based on the employment-topopulation ratio. Here we define the annual change in the employment-to-population ratio in sector k in commuting zone i from t − 3 to t as
where for each commuting zone i and between t − 3 and t, ∆L ikt is the annual employment change in sector k, andP it is the mid-point working-age population (i.e.,P it = (P it + P it−3 )/2). The working-age population for each commuting zone i and each year t, P it , is obtained from AADHP, who construct it from the Census Population Estimates. The measure in (10) is slightly different from the measure used by AADHP, ∆ (L ikt /P it ). We use the alternative measure to cleanly separate each of the job-flow components, but importantly, the regressions for the net effect are barely altered if we use instead the original AADHP measure.
With a slight notational abuse, we split the annual change in the employment-to-population ratio into its job-flow components as
where b ikt denotes the contribution of births to the change in the employment-to-population ratio in sector k in commuting zone i, and the same for deaths (d ikt ), expansions (e ikt ), and contractions
with analogous expressions for d ikt , e ikt , and c ikt .
The specifications to estimate the net and gross employment effects of local Chinese import exposure are
and sector k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, D k is a sectoral dummy, Z ikt is a vector of commuting zone i-sector k controls, α kt and α F kt are sector-time fixed effects, and ε ikt and ε F ikt are error terms. Our coefficients of interest are the β k 's and the β F k 's because they show the net and gross local responses to Chinese exposure of the employment-to-population ratio for each sector. As before, it is always true that
for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Table 4 shows the estimation of (11) and (12) for the 1992-2010 and 1992-2007 periods. In addition to sector-time fixed effects, we follow AADHP and include as controls (i) the commuting zone's manufacturing share (at the beginning of each period) interacted with sector dummies, and (ii) regional Census division dummies interacted with sector dummies. All regressions are weighted by total population in 1992, and standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level. In contrast to Tables 1-3, where each coefficient was the estimate of β or β F from a single regression, in Table 4 each group of three columns in a row gives the estimates of β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 (or β F 1 , β F 2 , and β F 3 ) from a single regression. For example, the first three coefficients in the first row yieldβ 1 ,β 2 , andβ 3 from the estimation of (11) with NETS data from 1992 to 2010.
For both periods, the first row in Table 4 shows a strong and highly significant negative response of the employment-to-population ratio in the exposed sector to an increase in the commuting zone's Chinese exposure. In contrast to previous net results, the coefficient for the exposed sector for the 1992-2010 period (-1.77) is larger in magnitude than the benchmark coefficient of AADHP from our 1992-2011 replication-see online Appendix B-of their long-difference regression (-1.60). For the 1992-2007 net regression, the coefficient for the exposed sector in our three-year difference regression is only 16 percent smaller in magnitude than their 1992-2007 coefficient from our long-difference replication (-1.35 vs -1.61). 12
As in the industry-level analysis, the main driving factor of the decline in the exposed sector's employment-to-population ratio is an increase in job destruction due to establishments' deathsaccording to ourδ measure, deaths account for 66 percent of total Chinese-induced job reallocation in the exposed sector during the 1992-2010 period, and for 55 percent during the 1992-2007 period (see Table 5 ). Moreover, in both periods, the job-flow coefficients for the exposed sector show that an increase in job destruction by contractions also plays a prominent role in the decline of the employment-to-population ratio. Although the contractions' coefficients for the exposed sector are between 37 and 60 percent of the size of the deaths' coefficients, they are still very large a highly significant. Hence, the decline in this sector's employment-to-population ratio is a consequence of a large increase in gross job destruction through its two components.
The most interesting results from Table 4 arise from the nonexposed sectors. AADHP carefully discuss the China shock implications for job reallocations and aggregate demand effects for the nonexposed sectors, but they are not able to find statistically significant evidence of any of them. This is not surprising, given that aggregate demand effects and job reallocations from the exposed sector have opposite impacts on the employment-to-population ratios in the nonexposed sectors. (11) and (12), for F = {b, d, e, c, b − d, e − c, b + e, d + c}, and k ∈ {1(exposed), 2(nonexposed tradable), 3(nonexposed nontradable)}. All regressions include as controls sector-time fixed effects, the commuting zone's manufacturing share (at the beginning of each period) interacted with sector dummies, and regional Census division dummies interacted with sector dummies. All regressions are weighted by 1992 commuting-zone population. The net regression with CBP data is reported for the purpose of comparison with the net regression with NETS data. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the commuting-zone level. The coefficients are statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
Both of them may be important, but if they cancel out we will not be able to see any track of them by looking only at the net change. Fortunately, by being able to decompose net employment changes into their job-flow components we are in a better position to capture these effects. This is the case here.
For the nonexposed tradable sector, note that in contrast to AADHP, we are able to observe a statistically significant increase in the employment-to-population ratio after an increase in local Chinese exposure. This is evidence of an active and important job reallocation mechanism from the exposed sector. Even more interesting, this is not the result of higher rates of job creation in the nonexposed sector. To the contrary, there are statistically significant declines in the rates of creation by births and expansions, which point out toward negative aggregate demand effects. However, there are even larger significant declines in the rates of job destruction by deaths and contractions.
With nonexposed tradable firms hiring and being born at a lower pace, but dying and contracting at an even lower rate, the net result is a significant increase in the sector's employment-to-population ratio.
The nonexposed nontradable sector does not have a statistically significant increase in the employment-to-population ratio. However, the job flows regressions show a very large and statistically significant increase in the rate of job creation by births. This can also be part of job reallocation effects: as the exposed sector sheds jobs (mainly through deaths), some of the released workers create new establishments in the nonexposed sector; there may even be previously exposedsector establishments that are reborn in a different nonexposed industry. Although the increase in the gross rate of job creation in the nonexposed nontradable sector is very large and significant, the high but imprecise change in the rate of job destruction renders the net effect positive but insignificant. 13
With the NETS data we obtain the same qualitative results for exposed and unexposed sectors during both periods. The only difference that is worth pointing out between the 1992-2010 and 1992-2007 NETS regressions, is that excluding the Great Recession period causes a large decline in the size of some coefficients. Notably, the import-exposure coefficient on deaths for the exposed sector declines from 1.46 to 0.97, which drives a change in the net coefficient from -1.78 to -1.35. This difference suggests that the large employment losses during the Great Recession may be causing an upward bias in the magnitude of the deaths' import-exposure coefficient.
The Great Recession period has an even greater impact in the estimation with CBP data. In the last row of Table 4 , the 1992-2010 regression does not yield any significant estimates, but the 1992-2007 regression shows that this changes once we remove the Great Recession period. In such a case, the coefficient for the exposed sector is not only highly significant, but is also very close to the net coefficient estimated using the NETS data. As in AADHP, the three-year difference estimation with CBP data does not produce statistically significant import-exposure coefficients for the nonexposed sectors. Table 5 shows Chinese-induced predicted employment changes from the specifications in Table   4 . Given that the dependent variable is now based on the employment-to-population ratio, we can no longer use a formula analogous to (6). Instead, the predicted net employment change in sector k from the change in commuting-zone import penetration during the 1992-2010 period is given by
whereβ k is the net estimated coefficient either from NETS or CBP, IP CZ i10 − IP CZ i92 is the change in import exposure for commuting zone i from 1992 to 2010, P i10 is the working-age population in commuting zone i in 2010, and ρ = 0.46 (we follow AADHP in using the same ρ for all the calculations of predicted employment changes). We use a similar formula for the 1992-2007 period.
For the 1992-2010 period, Chinese-induced net predicted losses are about 2.817 million jobs in the exposed sector, but there are also significant net predicted gains of 472,000 jobs in the nonexposed tradable sector. The nonexposed nontradable sector creates 1.75 million jobs from births of establishments-a sign of job reallocation from the exposed sector-but this effect is canceled out by large (but not statistically significant) job destruction from deaths and contractions.
Comparing these results against those obtained in our AADHP replication in Appendix B for the 1992-2011 period, we find that net predicted losses in the exposed sector are almost equal to those obtained here (2.822 million jobs). Given our discussion above about the large reduction in the size of the deaths' import-exposure coefficient when we exclude the Great Recession period, we are cautious about this almost-perfect match.
For the 1992-2007 period, net predicted losses in the exposed sector due to Chinese import exposure are 1.599 million jobs, and net predicted gains in the nonexposed tradable sector are 239,000 jobs. The nonexposed nontradable sector creates 1.115 million jobs from establishments' births, but the net effect is not significant. When using the CBP data, the net predicted losses in the exposed sector are 1.449 million jobs, which are about 9 percent smaller than the net losses when using the NETS data. Hence, although the industry-level analysis consistently predicted considerably smaller net losses with NETS, the local-labor-markets analysis produces more balanced employment predictions. The 1992-2007 replication of the equivalent AADHP's long-difference specification predicts net losses in the exposed sector of 2.467 million jobs. This corresponds to 70 percent more net employment losses when compared to the CBP prediction from our three-year difference specification.
The following section discusses a possible source of this inconsistency.
Past Employment Changes and Future Import Exposure: A Falsification Exercise
The main difference between the econometric specifications in this paper and those in AADHP is that here we use three-year differences from 1992 to 2010, with most regressions having either five or six non-overlapping periods, while AADHP use long differences with two stacked periods (1991-1999 and either 1999-2011 or 1999-2007) . 14 To be closer to our period of study, the AADHP replication we carry over in Appendix B starts in 1992 rather than in 1991. In all specifications, the dependent variable and import-exposure regressors are annualized; thus, the import-exposure coefficients from our three-year difference framework are directly comparable to those obtained using the long-difference framework.
Throughout section 4 we found that the Chinese-exposure coefficients of the CBP three-year difference regressions are smaller in magnitude than those from the AADHP long-difference replication. As a consequence, Chinese-induced net job losses from AADHP's long-difference approach are between 1.7 and 3.3 times larger than those predicted with our three-year difference approach.
A strong argument supporting the large discrepancy is that changes in import exposure take a long time to be absorbed by labor markets, so that a long-difference approach better captures these long-term effects. On the other hand, such long differences (ranging between seven-year and
twelve-year differences) may confound past employment changes with future increases in import exposure.
Conveniently, the last point can be easily tested with a falsification exercise that barely alters our econometric specifications: we simply replace the Chinese import exposure regressor in each specification with its three-year lead. Hence, the specification in (3) becomes
and the same for our specifications in (4), (10), and (12). Using employment data from 1992 to 2007, and thus import exposure data from 1995 to 2010, Table 6 shows the results of the falsification Notes: This table reports the outcome of the falsification exercise that replaces the contemporaneous Chinese import-exposure regressors with their three-year leads for the specifications indicated in the columns' titles. All regressions in the first three columns are weighted by 1992 employment, and their standard errors are clustered at the three-digit industry level. All regressions in the last three columns are weighted by 1992 commutingzone population, and their standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the commuting-zone level. The coefficients are statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
exercise. Each column's title indicates the equivalent specification-with the contemporaneous
Chinese-exposure regressor-from section 4.
Here we start by looking at the net outcomes with CBP data in the last row of Table 6 . For the industry-level analysis, the coefficients in columns 1-3 are negative, highly significant, and between 25 and and 37 percent smaller in size than their counterparts in section 4. Interestingly, if we add the "false" coefficients in columns 1-3 to their section 4 counterparts, we obtain coefficients that are closer to those obtained in the long-difference specifications; incidentally, the sum of the false CBP coefficient in the first column of Table 6 (-0.52) and the corresponding coefficient in Table 1 of column 3 (-0.74), is equal to the 1992-2007 coefficient of the AADHP replication in Appendix B
(-1.26). As well, the commuting-zone level false CBP regression yields similar qualitative results to those in Table 4 and in the AADHP analysis-a negative and highly significant coefficient for the exposed sector, and non-significant coefficients for the nonexposed sectors-but the false exposedsector coefficient is 17 percent higher in magnitude than its counterpart in Table 4 . These findings suggest that an important component of the Chinese-induced net losses calculated by AADHP are the result of predicting past employment changes with future import exposure.
As with the CBP data, the NETS industry-level estimation in columns 1-3 of Table 6 indicates that future changes in Chinese exposure are significantly associated with past net job destruction.
As in our main findings, deaths of establishments are the main driver of this result. On the other hand, the commuting-zone level false estimation with NETS produces net results that are different in significance and size from their counterparts in Table 4 . We observe, however, substantial and significant false action in the job flows regressions, which suggests that the long-difference approach generates an important amount of false job reallocations.
Concluding Remarks
The China shock is associated with net job destruction in the United States. Using job flows calculated from the universe of U.S. establishments, our industry-level analysis shows that the net job destruction is mainly driven by the death of establishments. An alternative local-labor-market analysis shows that deaths play the dominant role in the decline in the employment-to-population ratio in the sector of the economy exposed to Chinese import competition, but that this import competition also led to some gross job destruction via contractions of existing establishments.
A novelty of this paper is that it provides evidence of job reallocations from the exposed sector to the nonexposed sectors of the commuting area. Highlighting the importance of looking at job flows, rather than only at net changes, our results show that the reallocation of jobs toward the nonexposed tradable sector happened even with a significant reduction in the gross rate of the sector's job creation, because of an even higher reduction in the gross rate of job destruction.
Our finding that the China shock is mostly felt through plant closings can improve our understanding of the costs associated with this trade. At the worker level, the long-run outcome may be better after a death than after a contraction (Stevens, 1997) , in part because mass layoffs may reflect firms getting rid of lower-productivity workers first and thus giving a negative signal about the fired workers' quality (Gibbons and Katz, 1992) . On the other hand, Abowd, McKinney, and Vilhuber (2009) find that closings are more likely for firms that disproportionately hire workers from the bottom quartile of the human capital distribution.
Moreover, there is evidence of more adverse effects of plant closings on minorities and women.
Black men experience larger earning losses than white men after plant closings (Hu and Taber, 2011) , and more women report depression after plant closings than men (Brand, Levy, and Gallo, 2008) . Hence, policy makers looking to tailor their response to adversely-affected groups may worry more about traditionally-disadvantaged groups after an establishment death than after a contraction.
From a local-labor-markets point of view, regional economies are likely to suffer more from deaths than from contractions (which tend to be one-off events or cyclical) because closed establishments can more permanently reduce local employment. Herzog and Schlottmann (1995) find, for example, that displaced workers have the lowest reemployment rates in areas that have suffered higher plant closing rates. As well, wage reductions among displaced workers are in part due to poorly performing local economies (Carrington, 1993) . Therefore, the persistent effects of establishments' deaths in local labor markets make a case for strengthening relocation incentives in the U.S. government's Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program.
With deaths playing such a crucial role in Chinese-induced employment dynamics, it is important to learn more about the dying establishment's characteristics. Are they small or large? Are they young or mature? If they are young, are they dying too soon (before realizing their potential) or are they old and dying as part of a healthy process of creative destruction? Previous research by Bernard and Jensen (2002) show that the kinds of plants most likely to die after exposure to import competition from low-income countries are low-wage, labor-intensive plants within exposed industries, and those owned by multi-plant, multinational firms (Bernard and Jensen, 2007) . Relatedly, Magyari (2017) indicates that plant closures from the China shock are mostly among multinational firms that are redistributing the jobs between their factories. Further answers to these types of questions would deepen our understanding of the costs and benefits of trade with China.
Finally, an important caveat is that our paper does not assess the overall consequences of trade on job flows, but is restricted to the analysis of trade with one country (albeit the largest U.S. trading partner). And the fact that we find some positive reallocation effects highlights the fact that trade has beneficial effects on some sectors and firms. There are likely larger net beneficial effects from trade with other countries for which exports are larger relative to imports. Thus, although our research is focused on U.S. trade with one country, policy should focus more on the overall effects of trade. Our evidence suggests that trade with China has led to some "rusted-out factories ... across the landscape of our nation." But this is not the whole story. Due to deaths -18,519 -17,028 -13,593 -11,823 -11,508 -17,454 -18,183 -19,291 -14,490 
Net employment growth -0.28** -0.34*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.31*** -0.27*** (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0 Notes: This table reports results for the effects of direct + upstream, and direct + upstream + downstream higher-order Chinese import exposure on annualized three-year log-employment changes and job flows. Regressions are weighted by 1992 employment. The net growth regression with CBP data is weighted by 1992 CBP employment. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the three-digit industry level. The coefficients are statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level. 
